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Abstract
Our paper gives an overview of studies on the effect of the temporal resolution of uncer-
tainty (TRU) on asset pricing. It also conducts an empirical analysis using recent data on cor-
porate bonds issued in Japan as well as from the International Brokers Estimate System
(IBES) database for earnings forecasts from which we construct proxies for TRU. Our analysis
does not support the hypothesis that firms with a more delayed resolution of uncertainty offer
larger yields.
1. Introduction
Many papers study the determinants of corporate bond prices. A pioneer work, Merton
(1974), considers the issuance of a discount bond with a default option as a European put
option issued to stockholders by bondholders, and applies the Black-Sholes formula to derive
corporate bond pricing. This framework, often called a structural framework, indicates that
credit spreads over interest rates can be explained by only firm-specific factors such as matu-
rity, volatility in the value of the firm, and debt-equity ratios. Many empirical works, however,
do not support structural frameworks. Using various structural frameworks, Huang and Huang
(2003) show that credit risk does not contribute to yield spreads in the US. In reduced-form
frameworks, in which default risks are determined exogenously, Elton, Gauber, Agrawal and
Mann (2001) empirically demonstrate that an expected default loss does not help to explain
the premiums of corporate rates over treasuries. Instead, taxes and factors that explain risk
premiums for stocks are very important. 
Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001) try to discover which factors account for
yields spreads by using many proxies for firm-specific factors, such as default probability and
recovery rates. Their regression analysis shows that firm-specific factors can only explain
25% of the observed yield spread changes in the US. Moreover, they use the residuals from
these regressions to conduct a principal components analysis and they report that the residuals
are mostly driven by a single common factor. The factor is not explained by any set of macro-
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economic variables to a perfect degree, but it is correlated with overall market liquidity to
some extent. Focusing on liquidity factors, Houweling, Mentink and Vorst (2005) consider
nine proxies and find that eight of them are important in determining credit spreads in Europe. 
In Japan, Ueki (1999), Ieda and Ohba (1998), and Ieda (2001) examine possible determi-
nants of credit risk and all of them claim that credit ratings play a major role in determining
credit spreads. Nakashima and Saito (2006) find that macroeconomic factors are also respon-
sible for credit spreads. As a new proxy for a liquidity factor, Kaguraoka (2005) proposes the
kurtosis of changes in yields, and, using Japanese panel data, he finds that the kurtosis works
well. (See Xu (2007) for recent studies on corporate bond markets in Japan and other Asian
countries.) 
As another determinant, Reisz and Perlich (2006) find in their empirical work that the
temporal resolution of uncertainty (TRU) plays an important role in determining US corporate
bond yields. TRU, defined later in a more rigid way, is the extent to which incoming informa-
tion may change expectations about cash flows. One industry’s uncertainty is resolved later
than others, even though they need the same developing time and face the same (overall) risks
and returns. For example, most pharmaceutical companies’ uncertainty will not be resolved
before the very last approval by the government. The structure involved in the arrival of infor-
mation is an important element in the capital budgeting process that might affect investors’
decisions. 
Some theoretical papers investigate the effect of TRU on asset pricing. A pioneer work,
Epstein and Turnbull (1980), shows that because the release of information makes it risky to
hold assets, the returns on risky assets are larger when uncertainty is resolved earlier.
However, they assume that no production decisions are taken after the experiment results
become known and that the manager communicates observations truthfully. That is, their
model does not take into consideration the possibility of moral hazard in that the manager
may release spurious information. 
Apart from Epstein and Turnbull’s (1980) assumption, Reisz and John (2002) integrate
TRU considerations in an agent model. In their model, the manager can change investment
policy using a private signal regarding the pattern of TRU. They prove that the later the uncer-
tainty is resolved for a given firm, the larger the yield premiums are. The later resolution of
uncertainty makes the distribution of the final cash flows of the firm riskier and thus increases
the probability of bankruptcy. Bondholders, who know the pattern of TRU but do not observe
the private signal, rationally demand a larger yield premium at the time of issuance. 
Miyazaki and Saito (2006) give another explanation of why firms with later resolutions
of uncertainty are required to have higher yields. Epstein (1980) demonstrates that consumers
with a high elasticity of inter-temporal substitution tend to postpone commitment to an irre-
versible decision. Instead, they choose to hold flexible assets when they expect uncertainty to
be resolved subsequently. Using Kreps-Porteus (1979) preferences, Miyazaki and Saito (2004)
show that consumers hold more flexible assets not only because of a higher elasticity of inter-
temporal substitution but also because of a preference for the early resolution of uncertainty.
However, Epstein (1980)’s and Miyazaki and Saito (2004)’s implications are based on partial
equilibrium models. On the other hand, Miyazaki and Saito (2006) numerically demonstrate
that premiums over risk-free assets are generated in a general equilibrium framework. They
call such premiums waiting-options premiums. 
Reisz and Perlich (2006) study the effect of TRU on corporate debts. They design proxies
for TRU, and find that the later the uncertainty is resolved, the larger the yields are on US cor-
porate debts issued between 1987 and 1996. To distinguish whether agency-driven increases in
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risk or intrinsic timing preferences explain larger premiums for firms with a later resolution of
uncertainty, they construct an ordered probit model, find that TRU is not another risk factor,
and conclude that investors display the intrinsic timing preferences proposed by Kreps-Porteus
(1979). Although they do not mention Miyazaki and Saito (2006) as a reference, their results
may imply that corporate spreads are explained not only by risk premiums but also by wait-
ing-options premiums. 
This paper gives an overview of studies on the effect of TRU on asset pricing, and it con-
ducts an empirical analysis using recent data on corporate bonds issued in Japan. We describe
three theoretical frameworks: those proposed by Epstein and Turnbull (1980), Reisz and John
(2002), and Miyazaki and Saito (2006). Following Reisz and Perlich (2006)’s methodology,
we perform an empirical analysis, and find that this analysis does not work well. Our primary
contribution in this paper is to investigate the effect of TRU on Japan’s corporate bond yields. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we give mathematical definitions
of TRU as well as for three theoretical frameworks proposed by Epstein and Turnbull (1980),
Reisz and John (2002), and Miyazaki and Saito (2006). In section 3, we present Reisz and
Perlich (2006)’s empirical methodology and include empirical proxies for TRU, and we con-
duct an empirical analysis of the effect of TRU on Japan’s corporate bonds. Section 5 con-
cludes the paper. 
2. Theoretical Framework
This section gives mathematical definitions of TRU, then it summarizes the main results
of Epstein and Turnbull (1980), Reisz and John (2002), and Miyazaki and Saito (2006). 
1. Temporal resolution of uncertainty
Let us consider the following general decision problem:
( , , ),max max x xE E W Z
( )
Z Y 1 2
1 1 2 2 1
x x xc c! !
T
where x
1
and x
2
are real scalars representing decision variables at periods 1 and 2, respective-
ly; C
1
and C
2
(x
1
) are convex sub-sets of the non-negative real line with non-empty interiors; U
is a concave and twice continuously differentiable in (x
1
, x
2
). The random variable F reflects
uncertainty about the future economic environment. The true value of F becomes known at
the end of period 2. Before choosing x
2
, the agent receives some information about F by
observing a random variable T, which is correlated with F to some extent. As a Bayesian
decision maker, the agent revises the prior probability distribution for F at the beginning of
period 1. It should be noticed that when choosing x
1
before observing T, the agent allows for
the prospect of future information about F. The constraint set C
2
(x
1
), which the agent faces in
choosing x
2
, depends on x
1
. 
Consider another signal T', which is correlated with F to some extent. The signal T is
said to be more informative than T' when using T is at least as good as using T' before mak-
ing a decision concerning x
1
. Following Marschak and Miyasawa (1968), T is more informa-
tive than T' if and only if 
( , , ) ( , , )max maxx x x xE E W Z E E W Z
( ) ( )
Z Y Z Y1 2 1 2
2 2 1 2 2 1
x x x xc c
$
! !
T T l l
for all x
1
, W, and C
2
(x
1
) as far as the maximum exists. When a signal is more informative, the
uncertainty is said to be resolved earlier. 
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When F and T are discrete random variables, Marschak and Miyasawa (1968) present an
alternative definition, which they prove is necessary and sufficient for the former definitions.
The variables F and T take (z
1
, ..., z
m
) and (y
1
, ..., y
n
) , respectively. The corresponding proba-
bility vectors are p= (p
1
, ..., p
n
)' and q= (q
1
, ..., q
n
)' , where p
i
= Pr (F= z
i
) and q
j
= Pr (T= y
j
).
The posterior probability matrix is denoted by ∏=[r
ij
], where r
ij
=Pr (F= z
i
| T= y
j
). When
another signal T' takes (y
1
, ..., y
n
), q' and ∏' are defined in an obvious way. Then the signal T
is more informative than T' if 
( ) ( )q qj
j
n
j j
j
n
j
1 1
$r rU U
= =
! !
for any convex function U. Clearly the reverse inequality holds if U is concave. Using the def-
inition, Epstein (1980), Miyazaki and Saito (2004), and Miyazaki and Saito (2006) obtain
some interesting propositions. 
When m=n=2, Jones and Ostroy (1984) presents a more parsimonious definition. Let
p1=q
1
=a (p
2
=q
2
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( ) ( )
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The parameter t takes a value between zero and one. As t approaches one, the signal is more
informative, and the uncertainty is resolved earlier. Using this definition, Jones and Ostroy
(1984) and Miyazaki and Saito (2006) provide interesting examples. 
Epstein and Turnbull (1980) prove that when F and T have a bi-variate normal distribu-
tion, there exists a convenient intuitive parameterization. Let (F, T) and (F', T' ) have bi-vari-
ate normal distribution with identical marginals. Then, T is more informative than T' if corr
(F, T)2 $ corr (F, T' )2 where corr (F, T) denotes the correlation coefficients. When corr (F,
T)=0 , consumers cannot receive a useless signal and no uncertainty is resolved at an interme-
diate date. This definition drives the theoretical implications from Epstein and Turnbull (1980)
and Reisz and John (2002). 
2. Epstein and Turnbull (1980) 
Epstein and Turnbull (1980) show that because the release of information makes it risky
to hold assets, the returns on risky assets are larger when the uncertainty is resolved earlier.
An investor faces a three-period time horizon and makes consumption-savings decisions to
maximizes the expected value of u (c
1
)+bu (c
2
)+b 2u (c2). Here u (c) is defined as u (c)= –exp
(Ac), in which A is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion with respect to uncertainty in con-
sumption. ( , )0 1!b is the subjective rate of discount. Markets for risk-free bonds and risky
equities are open at t =1 and t =2. Bonds are traded in unlimited amounts with fixed yields r
t
at period t. On the other hand, the number of equities is fixed and normalized to unity in each
period. The return on equities F is a random variable and the value is realized at t =3. 
The investor solves the following problem:
( ) ( ) ( ) ,max maxu w s u w s E u r b1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 2 2 2
, , , ,s b s b
- + - + +b b aE FT F T
a a
$ .
subject to ,
,
,
s p b
w P r b
s P b
1 1 1 1
2 2 1 2 1
2 2 2 2
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= +
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a
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Here p
1
is the first period price of the risky asset; P
2
is the first period expectation of the t-th
period asset price. It should be noted that the realization of P
2
is uniquely determined by the
realization of T. For t =1 and 2, a
t
and b
t
denote holdings of risky assets and of the bond,
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respectively. w
t
is the investor’s wealth at the beginning of period t. We assume w
1
=p
1
+b, where
b is the initial endowment of bonds. s
t
denotes the t-th period savings from w
t
from the begin-
ning of the period. E
T
denotes the expected value with respect to T, and EZ y denotes the
expected value with respect to F, conditional on T= y. It should be noted that s
2
, a
2
, b
2
s2, a2
and b2 are chosen after observing T, and that the return on purchasing the risky assets in peri-
od 1 is capital gains due to the change in asset prices between periods 1 and 2. 
As with TRU concerning F, we assume that F and T follow both normal distribution
with F～M (n
z
, v
z
2) and F～M (n
Y
, v
Y
2), respectively. When ( , )corr/t T F is larger, the sig-
nal T is more informative, and the resolution of uncertainty concerning T is resolved earlier. 
Let us consider the second period problem for a given w
2
and the realization y of T. Both
savings (s
2
) and portfolio (a
2
, b
2
) decisions must be made. We determine the latter conditional
on s
2
and then determine the optimal s
2
. The portfolio problem is 
( ( )) .max expE r P yy 2 2
2
- - -aA FF
a
7 A (1)
Since F and T have a multi-variate normal distribution, the objective function is
| ( | ) ( ))exp y V y r P y2
1 2 2
2 2:- - +a a aA E F A F A7< A F. In equilibrium, a
2
=1. Thus
( ) ( ) .P y r y V y
1
2
2
:= -E F A F8 B% / (2)
Let us return to the savings decision. It is determined as the solution of the problem
.( )max exp expw s r s V y2
1
2 2
2
2 2
2
2
s
- - + - - -b bA A A A Fc m7 A
The solution is straightforward, and the maximum value of the objective function is defined as
J (w
2
, y) where
( , ) ,expJ w y B r
r Aw12 2
2
2= - - +
b c m (3)
( ) ( ) .expB r r
r
r V y
1
2
1
1
/( )r
2
1 1
2
2
2
2
2= + -
+
b A F+ c dm n
Now we consider the first period problem. For given s
1
, the portfolio decision is deter-
mined as a solution to the problem
( ( ) ), ,max B J r s P y r p y1 1 1 2 1 1
1
: :- + -b aET
a
7 A
where the expected value is taken with respect to the realization y of T. The function J is a
negative exponential function with the absolute risk aversion measure r
2
A/(1+r
2
), so (3) is
similar to (1). Equilibrium in the market for a risky asset (a
1
=1) implies that the asset price is 
( ) ( ) .p r P r
r V P1 11 1 2 2
2
2= - +
E A' 1
The first period savings solve the problems
,max exp expw s B C r
r r s11 1 2
2
1 1
1
s
: : :- - + - -
+
bA A Ac m7 A
where ( ) .expC
r
r V P2
1
1 2
2
2
2
2
2= -
+
A
J
L
K
KK _
N
P
O
Oi The maximum value of the objective function is
( ) .expV w r r r
r r Aw
r r
r r r
r
B C r r
1
1
1
r r r
r
1
2 1 2
1 2 1
1 2
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2
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The solution of the period 1 decision problem implies a derived utility function for wealth
w
2
, which is a negative exponential function. Therefore, the period 1 decisions may be viewed
in a standard two-period framework and readily determined. Equilibrium in the period 1 mar-
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kets implies
( ) ( ) .p r P r
r V P1 11 1 2 2
2
2= - +
E A' 1
Let us denote the correlation between F and T by t. Since F and T have a multi-variate
normal distribution, ( ) ( )y yZ= = + -n t v
v nE F T
T
F
T and ( ) ( )V 1 Z
2 2= - t vF T . Thus,
we can obtain,
( ) ( ) ,P r
1 1Z Z2
2
2 2= - -n t vE A# -
( ) / .V P rZ2
2 2
2
2= t v
This indicates that the more informative T is for F, as measured by t2, the larger both the
mean and the variance of Q
2
are. Substituting the above equations into (2) leads to 
.p r r r
r1 1 1Z Z1 1 2 2
2
2
2= - -
+
n
t
vA f p* 4
That is, the equilibrium price of equities increases with t2. It should be noticed that if the
signal T provides no information about F, then p
1
=E(Q
2
)/r
2
, implying that the expected value
of the asset at t =2 is discounted at risk free rates of interest to determine its present value. The
systemic risk for the return over the first period is zero. 
The value of the signal T, as measured by its effect on the market value of the cash flow
F, is equal to r
r p
1 Z2
2
2
2
+
vA . Thus, we have the intuitive result that the firm’s valuation of a signal
varies inversely with the risk free rates of interest, and directly with the investor’s aversion to
risk, the variance of V, and the informativeness of the signal. The overall market risk associat-
ed with F is unambiguously reduced by specific information about the assets. 
In sum, because the release of information makes it risky to hold assets, returns on risky
assets are larger when the uncertainty is resolved earlier. However, Epstein and Turnbull
(1980) assume that no production decisions are taken after the experimental results become
known and that the manager communicates the observation truthfully. That is, their model
does not take into consideration the possibility of moral hazard in that the manager may
release spurious information. In the next sub-section, we integrate TRU considerations in an
agent model. 
3. Reisz and John (2002)
Here we present a three-date, two period model proposed by Reisz and John (2002). The
sequence of events is as follows. At t =0, the entrepreneur, who owns the rights to a firm but
does not have enough capital to finance it, sells claims consisting of debt and equity to outside
investors. The debt is sold entirely to outsiders, whereas the entrepreneur may retain some of
the equity or sell all of it. In both cases, the entrepreneur has an incentive to maximize the
combined value of both types of claims..
At t =1, the manager of a firm with cash resources of I is faced with two possible invest-
ments: a riskless one yielding the risk-free rate r
2
and a risky one yielding the stochastic rate F
with E(F) > r
2
. The manager makes a decision by observing a signal T. The signal and the
risky technology are assumed to have bi-variate normal distribution with each other, implying
that the signal gives some information to the manager about the risky technology. The manag-
er allocates his or her cash between the risky technology (a fraction Q) and the riskless invest-
ment (I–Q). At period t =2, the risky technology F is revealed and the firm is liquidated. 
Before the mathematical presentation, we provide several assumptions that are used in the
model. Investors are assumed to be risk-neutral. The firm has two types of marketed claims
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outstanding: debt and equity. The debt matures at t =2 and has the form of a pure discount
bond with a promised payment of F. We ignore bankruptcy costs and the tax advantages of
debt financing. The manager cannot issue further debt at t =1 after observing the result of the
signal and cannot invest a negative amount in the risky technology. The manager acts to maxi-
mize the wealth of current shareholders. In a rational expectations equilibrium, debt holders
and stock-holders correctly understand the effect of the debt structure and of TRU on the
investment decision and the effect of the decision on asset pricing, therefore the entrepreneur
bears the agency costs of any debt when selling securities at t =0. 
TRU is defined in the same way as in Epstein and Turnbull (1980). That is, F and T fol-
low both normal distribution with ( ) Z= nE F , ( )V Z
2= vF , ( )Y Y= nE , and ( )V Y
2= vT . When
( , )corr/t V F is larger, the signal V is more informative, and the resolution of uncertainty
concerning T is resolved earlier. 
At t =1, the manager tries to maximize the objective function:
( , , , ),max r U Q y F
1
,Q 0 1 2
t
! 6 @
where ( , , , ) ( , ( ) )maxU Q y F QZ I Q r y0 2/ + - =t E T8 B. For an all-equity firm, which does
not issue bonds, the face value of the debt F has to be zero. The pay-off to the shareholders is
positive if and only if ( )Q I Q r F2$+ -F or ( )/ /F I Q r Q *2$ /- -F F7 A . If the manager
chooses to invest very little money in the risky technology, two cases occur. First, when
Ir F2$ , the threshold value F* approaches 3- , so the firm will be solvent in all states of
nature since its final wealth will be Ir
2
. Second, when Ir
2
<F, F* tends to be 3, the firm will
never be solvent since its final wealth is insufficient to cover its debt obligations. Since no
bank would lend money with a face value greater than Ir
2
to our firm, we must assume that
F Ir2$ . 
Using the notation F* and denoting the probability distribution of F conditional on T by
( )P F T , we can re-write the objective function ( , , , )U Q y Ft as
( , , , ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),
U Q y F Q I Q r dP Z Y y
Q y I Q r F Q V y
*Z
y y
2
2 :
= + - =
= = + - - + =
t
{
F
E F T U B F T B
3
# 7
8
A
B
where ( ) * / ( )y V yx1= = - =B E F T F F T8 B , and U and { are respectively the standard
normal commutative probability function and the density function. 
The above expression ( , , , )U Q y Ft is the expected value at period 1 of cash flows that
shareholders received at period 2. The first term tells us that the firm is solvent with a proba-
bility of U(B
y
), bondholders have been repaid, and the shareholders get any remaining cash
flows. The second term tells us that the shareholders should be worried not only about
whether but also about how much the market value is above F. Reisz and John (2002) show
that ( , , , )U Q y Ft is convex, leading to a corner solution. Whether Q =0 or Q=I depends on the
value of x
1
the manager observes. They also show lim ( , , , )/U Q y F Q2 2 3= -t as y " 3-
and Q 0" , implying that investing everything in riskless bills may earn a higher yield in the
case of low y. 
A risk-shifting region is defined as a range of y values for which a leveraged firm will
invest in the risky technology, whereas an all-equity firm will prefer to put the money into
riskless bills. Reisz and John (2002) show that given a certain pattern of TRU, there exists a
unique cut-off value T0 above which the manager of an all-equity firm will invest in the risky-
technology. Similarly TF exists for a leveraged f irm. It should be noted that
( , , , )> ( , , , )U I y F U y F0t t for all y F$ T , whereas ( , , , ) ( , , , )U I y U y0 0 0#t t for all y <T0. 
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Reisz and John (2002) prove that for a given t, a leveraged firm will invest more than an
all-equity firm when TF<T0, and that in the Rothschild and Stiglitz sense investing in risky
technology is riskier when y F$ T than when y 0$ T . The quantity F0-T T is called the
extent of risk-shifting, and the extent of risk-shifting strictly increases with the face value F of
the firm’s debt, hence the larger F is, the riskier the terminal cash flow distribution is. 
As for the effect of the pattern of TRU t on investment policy, Theorem 1 in Reisz and
John (2002) shows that the cutoffs T0 and TF strictly increase with t, therefore the risk of the
firm’s terminal cash flow distribution and the probability of investing in the risky technology
decrease with t. Theorem 2 in Reisz and John (2002) proves that a higher t strictly lowers the
extent of risk shifting T0–TF. 
The above two theorems intuitively indicate that rational bondholders will demand a larg-
er price or equivalently a lower yield for the bonds of a firm in which uncertainty is resolved
earlier. Now we price the bond of the firm in a more rigid way. 
At period 1, when <y FT , the manager purchases riskless bills and the bond will be
worth F at period 2. When y F$ T , the manager invests in the risky technology and the bond
will be worth max[0, min (IF, F)] at period 2. Therefore, under the condition of a purchase of
riskless bonds, the period-1 value of the bond is F/r
2
. Under the condition of an investment in
risky technology, on the other hand, the period-1 value of the bond, denoted by ( , , )F y1 tB , is
( , , > ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
F y y r F dP y dP y
r F C y C
V y C
1
1
/
/
F
F I
F I
y y y
y y
1
2 0
2
:
= = + =
= + = -
+ = -
t
i { {
B T F T I F F T
U I E F T U A U
T A
3
##
7
7
A
A
)
$
3
.
where ( )/( ( ) )y 1 /y 2 1 2= = -v tA E F T F and /( ( ) )(< )C F 1 /y y y2 1 2= - -v tA I AF for all y.
The last line tells us that at period 1, bondholders expect the firm to be solvent and receive F
with probability ( )C yU , and even if the firm becomes insolvent, it still has a positive value
( )y: =I E F T on average with probability ( ) ( )Cy y-U A U . The last term is a convexity
adjustment. Because of ( ) ( )Var y 12 2= = -v tF T F , we can obtain 
( , , | > )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .F y y r C C C
1 /F
y y y y y y1
2
2 1 2:
=
-
+ - -t
v t
{ {B T
I
A U A A U
F # -
At period 0, the equilibrium price is equal to 
( , , ) ( ) ( , , > ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .
F r F dP y F y y dP y
r r F r
C C C dP y
1
1 1
/
F F
y
F
y
y y y y y y
0
1
1
1 2 2
2 1 2
F
F
F
:
#
= +
=
-
+
-
+ - -
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n v t
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A U A A U
3
3
3
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T
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3
According to Theorem 3 in Reisz and John (2002), the prices of corporate bonds increase
with t. The risk premium demanded on corporate bonds decreases with t. It should be noted
that this result stems from two effects. First, the higher t is, the higher the market value of the
firm is because the manager can carry out investment policy based on more reliable informa-
tion. Bondholders share this benefit with shareholders. This effect is called the “total firm
value effect”. Second, the higher t is, the narrower the extent of risk-shifting is and bondhold-
ers benefit from a smaller deviation from the optimal investment policy. This is called the
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“reduction-in-agency-games effect”. 
In sum, we show that the later the uncertainty is resolved for a given firm, the larger yield
premiums are. The later resolution of uncertainty makes the distribution of the final cash
flows of the firm riskier and thus increases the probability of bankruptcy. Bondholders, who
know the pattern of TRU but do not observe the private signal, rationally demand a larger
yield premium at the time of issuance. In the next sub-section, we consider a different inter-
pretation. 
4. Miyazaki and Saito (2006)
As shown, models proposed by both Reisz and John (2002) as well as by Epstein and
Turnbull (1980) are based on partial equilibrium frameworks in the sense that risk-free rates
are fixed. On the other hand, Miyazaki and Saito (2006) numerically demonstrate that premi-
ums over risk-free assets are generated in a general equilibrium framework. Such premiums,
which they call waiting-options premiums, are essentially different from Reisz and John
(2002)’s premiums. As the source of premiums, Reisz and Kose consider agency-driven
increases in risk, whereas Miyazaki and Saito (2006) consider intrinsic timing preferences. 
Before introducing Miyazaki and Saito (2006)’s general equilibrium model, we provide a
partial equilibrium model. This model follows Epstein (1980) and Miyazaki and Saito (2004).
Epstein (1980) demonstrates that consumers with a high elasticity of inter-temporal substitu-
tion tend to postpone commitment to an irreversible decision and instead choose to hold flexi-
ble assets when they expect uncertainty to be resolved subsequently. Using Kreps and Porteus
(1979) preferences, Miyazaki and Saito (2004) show that consumers hold more flexible assets
not only because of the larger elasticity of inter-temporal substitution, but also because of a
preference for the early resolution of uncertainty. Epstein (1980) examined rational choice
between non-durable consumption and liquid assets (free of both risk and transaction costs)
under the expectation of some resolution of uncertainty. 
A consumer is endowed with w
0
units of consumption goods in period 0, and has access
to financial markets to allocate consumption goods between three periods. The consumer
invests in risk-free assets in period 0 and in risky assets in period 1. Investment in period 0
yields a fixed return R f per period, whereas investment in period 1 yields a random return R x
per period, which takes positive values (r
1
, ..., r
m
) with probability pT=(p
1
, ..., p
m
) where p
i
=Pr
(R x=r
i
). In period 1, the consumer receives a signal T, which is correlated with the period-2
realization of R x. The arrival of such a signal may resolve uncertainty concerning a random
return to some extent. The signal takes (y
1
, ..., y
n
) with probability qT= (q
1
, ..., q
m
) where q
j
=Pr
(T=y
j
). The posterior probability distribution is denoted by Π=(r
ij
), where r
ij
=Pr
(R x=r
i
|T=T
j
). By construction, Πq=p. 
Given the above set-up, the consumer maximizes the following objective function:
( , ) ,max w a q J a y
( )
j j
j
0
1
1
1
1 1
- + b
-
-
-
- -
a
v
v
c
v c
v v
v
!_ ei o
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S
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( , ) ( ) ( ) ;max x xJ a y R a r
( )
x
j
f
ij i
i
1 1
1
1 1
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-
-
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v
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S
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W
W
( )a a w0 0# # and ( )x x R a0 f# # denote savings in periods 0 and 1 respectively; (> )0b is a
discount factor; v is the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution; and c is the degree of rela-
tive risk aversion. This functional form has an advantage in that a preference for early (late)
Kenji MIYAZAKI
59
resolution can be controlled. To be specific, if vc>1, then an early resolution of uncertainty is
preferred, and vice versa. When vc=1, the above set-up reduces to the case of expected utility
explored by Epstein (1980). 
Miyazaki and Saito (2006) present the following proposition. An earlier resolution of
uncertainty or a more informative signal increases risk-free savings in period 0 if and only if
v > 1,  v+c > 2   or   0 < v < 1,  v+c < 2,
and it reduces savings if
v > 1,  v+c > 2   or   0 < v < 1,  v+c < 2.
Under the former condition, a consumer postpones a commitment to carry out current
expenditures on consumption goods with an earlier resolution of uncertainty. When v>1, then
v+c>2 jointly promotes a postponement of such a commitment when there is an early resolu-
tion of uncertainty. Since v+c>2 is a sufficient condition for the preference of early resolu-
tion, or, equivalently, vc>1, we can say that a consumer with a strong preference for both
early resolution and inter-temporal substitution tends to increase savings in order to wait for
uncertainty to be partially resolved. 
In the above setting, an incentive to postpone consumption (irreversible expenditure) until
uncertainty is resolved, to some extent, triggers demand for risk-free assets. Such demand is
expected to result in decreases in risk-free rates or increases in waiting-options premiums in a
general equilibrium set-up. Embedding the previous three-period model into an overlapping
economy, Miyazaki and Saito (2006) present a general equilibrium model. 
Each generation is called young, middle-aged, or old. The population of each generation
is constant over time and normalized to be one. Each generation has access to financial mar-
kets to allocate consumption goods over three periods. Young consumers are endowed with w
0
(>0) units of goods and can lend or borrow in one-period risk-free assets. Unlike the partial
equilibrium model, middle-aged consumers endowed with w
1
(>0) units can invest in one-peri-
od risky assets as well as in one-period risk-free assets. We assume that they cannot hold short
positions in risky assets, but can in risk-free assets. One-period returns on risky assets R
t
x are
given endogenously, whereas one-period risk-free rates R
t
f are determined endogenously as a
result of transactions between young and middle-aged consumers. We assume that young con-
sumers cannot participate in risky asset markets. 
For the purpose of numerical experiments, Miyazaki and Saito (2006) adopt a parsimo-
nious characterization by Jones and Ostroy (1984). This characterization is discussed in the
first sub-section in this section. As t approaches one, the signal is more informative, and the
uncertainty is resolved earlier. 
In the next section, we will consider both the case in which all generations experience a
resolution of uncertainty in an identical manner and the case in which only a particular gener-
ation can receive the interim signal. Given the above initial endowments and financial oppor-
tunities, a representative consumer born at date t maximizes the following problem with
respect to an investment plan (risk-free bonds a t
t
and a t
t+1
, and risky assets x t
t+1
) as follows:
( ( , ) ) ,max w a J a ( )
a
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t t
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a t
t
and x t
t
denote savings in risk-free bonds and in risky assets, respectively, and E
t
is the con-
ditional expectation operator based on the information available at date t. 
An equilibrium risk-free rate is determined endogenously by the lending–borrowing
process between young and middle-aged consumers. Using dynamic programming techniques,
we can derive the optimal asset demands a t
t
, a t
t+1
, and x t
t+1
as:
( ),
( , , , ),
( , , , ),x
a f
a g a R R
h a R R
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t t
t
t
t t
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f
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t
f
t
f
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1 1 1
1 1 1
=
=
=
X
T
T
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+ + +
where the information set tX is recursively defined as , , , , ,x a a R R xt t tt tt tt t
f
t1 1
2
1
2
1
1=X X - -
-
-
-
-
-# ,
tT -. (See Appendix B in Miyazaki and Saito (2006) for more detailed descriptions of f i, g i,
and hi.) Then, an equilibrium risk-free rate R f
t
is determined such that 
a t
t
+ a
t
t-1 =0.
Actually, it is impossible to solve the model analytically. So Miyazaki and Saito (2006)
resort to numerical investigations, and demonstrate that both the level of risk of investment
opportunities and the resolution of uncertainty influence an equilibrium risk-free rate.
Decreases driven by risk-averse behavior are referred to as risk-premiums, whereas decreases
due to a resolution of uncertainty are called waiting-options premiums. Specifically, let us
denote R f
0
, R f
t
, E(R x) to be an equilibrium risk-free rate in the case of t=0, an equilibrium
risk-free rate in the case of t>0, and the mean return on risky assets. Risk-premiums and
waiting-options premiums are calculated through E(R x)–R f
0
and R f
0
–R f
t
, respectively. The
authors’ numerical examples show that consumers with large elasticities of inter-temporal sub-
stitution, as well as strong preferences for an early resolution of uncertainty, generate vigorous
demand for risk-free assets. This results in positive waiting-options premiums. 
Whether later resolution of uncertainty generates premiums or not depends on timing
preference. In the set-up of Reisz and John (2002), when the uncertainty is resolved later
( 0"t ), higher premiums are generated. On the other hand, Miyazaki and Saito (2006)
demonstrate that more premiums are generated both when the uncertainty is resolved earlier
and when investors prefer an early resolution of uncertainty. This indicates that when investors
have a strong preference for late resolution, companies with a late resolution of uncertainty
are required to have higher premiums over riskless assets. 
3. Empirical Analysis
Section 3 presents Reisz and Perlich (2006)’s empirical methodology including empirical
proxies for TRU and then applies the methodology to Japan’s corporate bond markets to sum-
marize the results. 
1. Proxies for the temporal resolution of uncertainty
To design proxies for TRU, Reisz and Perlich (2006) use earnings forecasts and realiza-
tions from the international brokers estimate system (IBES) database. They pay attention to
the speed at which uncertainty is resolved for a given firm through analysts’ abilities to fore-
cast the future. Analysts can predict the short-term earnings of a firm with a late resolution of
uncertainty, and as the forecast horizon is extended, they find this more difficult. Reisz and
Perlich (2006) construct the following three statistics that measure how much more difficult it
is to forecast the long-term versus the short-term future. 
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First, v
long
and v
year
, respectively, denote standard deviations across analysts’ forecasts of
long-term earnings and the standard deviation of yearly earnings forecasts. The ratio v
long
/v
year
measures how much more analysts disagree about long-term earnings versus earnings one
year from the forecast date. A firm with a more delayed resolution of uncertainty should dis-
play a larger ratio. 
Second, we define RMSE
quarter
as the root mean square error of standardized forecast
errors (E
t
–F
t-1, t
)/S
t-1
for a firm over the 20 quarters before the event date, where E
t
is the actual
earnings realization at t, F
t, t–1
denotes the median forecast made at date t–1 for earnings at date
t, and S
t–1
the equity price at t–1. Similarly, RMSE
year
denotes the root mean error over the five
years. Firms with more delayed resolution of uncertainty should display a larger
RMSE
year
/RMSE
quarter
ratio. 
Third, we define t
quarter
as the correlation between the time series of standardized median
quarterly forecasted innovations (F
t–1, t
–E
t–1
)/S
t–1
and the time series of standardized quarterly
actual earnings innovations (E
t
–E
t–1
)/S
t–1
for a firm over the 20 quarters before the event date.
Similarly, t
year
denotes the correlation over five years. Firms with a more delayed resolution of
uncertainty should display a larger t
year
/t
quarter
ratio. 
2. Reisz and Perlich (2006)
To investigate whether and how TRU affects asset pricing, Reisz and Perlich (2006) use
data for newly issued corporate bonds in the United States. The sample consists of 1,299
plain-vanilla, option-free, dealer-priced bonds without any unusual characteristics, quoted
between January 1, 1987, and December 31, 1996, and issued by 474 different firms. The
price quote is taken at the end of the second month after issuance to remove unusual volatility. 
Reisz and Perlich (2006) investigate whether constructed yield spreads over Treasury,
y–y T at the issue date depend on TRU. Many empirical papers indicate that yield spreads are
influenced by firm size, financial leverage, operational risk, growth options, cash availability,
and duration. These variables may be correlated with TRU. We control for them to avoid any
omitted variable bias. 
Their regression has the following form:
( / )y y SIZE D E RISK
GROWTH CASH DURATION
TRUT 0 1 2 3 4
5 6 7
- = + + + +
+ + + +
a a a a a
a a a f (4)
where y denotes the yield to maturity on a particular bond; y T is its Treasury yield; TRU is a
relevant measure of the temporal resolution of uncertainty the firm faces; SIZE is the natural
logarithm of firm sales as a measure of firm size; D/E is the book value of the firm’s debt
(computed as the book value of assets minus the book value of the equity) divided by the mar-
ket value of its equity as a measure of its financial leverage; RISK is the variance in the
changes in the logarithm of the market value of assets (computed as debt plus the market
value of equity) over five years before the issue date as a proxy for overall risk; GROWTH is
the ratio of market-to-book value of the firm’s assets as a proxy for growth options; CASH is
the earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) divided by the
book value of the assets as a measure of free cash flows; DURATION is the bond’s duration,
and f is an error term that they assume to be homoskedastic to and uncorrelated with regres-
sors. 
As for SIZE, they select firm sales instead of market value to avoid multi-collinearity
with GROWTH (market-to-book value), and they use logarithms because the size effect is
expected to be most apparent when values are low. As for CASH, they divide EBITDA by the
book value of the assets rather than the market value of the assets to avoid a mechanical with
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D/E:
/( ).marketvalueof equity
EBITDA
marketvalueof assets
EBITDA
marketvallueof equity
book valueof debt
1= +
As discussed in sub-section 2.3, Reisz and John (2002) suggest that investors will
demand higher yields from firms with a more delayed resolution of uncertainty. The estimate
of the coefficient a
1
is thus expected to be negative when t
year
/t
quarter
is used, and positive when
v
long
/v
year
or RMSE
year
/RMSE
quarter
is used. Regardless of whether a
1
is significant or not, the
estimate of a
2
is expected to be negative because larger firms are given more attention and
therefore have fewer information asymmetrics. The coefficient a
6
is expected to be negative
because cash-rich firms are less likely to default. The other estimates a
3
, a
4
, a
5
, and a
7
are
positive because investors will demand higher yields from firms with more default risk, more
growth options, or on bonds with a longer duration. 
Reisz and Perlich (2006) conduct the regression analysis of (4) and find that the coeffi-
cients on v
long
/v
year
, RMSE
year/
/RMSE
quarter
, and t
year
/t
quarter
are positive at the 1% level, positive
at 5%, and negative at 5%, respectively. When all three proxies are included, the F-test of joint
significance for the three proxies yields a P-value of less than 0.01%. Other coefficients of the
regressors are significant at the 5% level. The evidence supports the hypothesis that even after
firm size, financial leverage, operational risk, growth options, cash availability, and duration
are all controlled for, firms with a more delayed resolution of uncertainty will have to offer
higher yields. 
Reisz and Perlich (2006) consider another regression, in which in order to deal with any
potentially omitted variable in regression (4), they control for all factors that rating agencies
consider relevant when assigning a grade to a bond by predicting a rating-controlled spread.
They report similar results and conclude that TRU influences bond yields in a robust manner.
Their conclusion could support both the agency-driven implications of Reisz and John (2002)
and the argument for investors timing preferences from Kreps and Porteus (1979) and
Miyazaki and Saito (2004). 
To distinguish between the two possible explanations, Reisz and Perlich (2006) conduct a
testing hypothesis. Reisz and John (2002) imply that TRU is another source of risk. So rating
agencies should allow for TRU when assigning grades to a firm. To investigate whether dis-
crete ordered variables such as ratings can be predicted by other factors, Reisz and Perlich
(2006) carry out an ordered probit analysis. 
The ordered probit model assumes that the discrete rating R is set to be 0 for Aaa bonds,
1 for Aa bonds, 2 for A bonds, 3 for Baa bonds, and 4 for Ba bonds, and that R is a discrete
categorization of a continuous unobserved measure R*. The measure R* is assumed to be a
linear function of some regressors V plus a normal disturbance h. That is, R*=V'b+h, where
h～N (0, v2). What is observed is R 0= if R 0*# , R 1= if R0 * 1# # n , ..., and R 4= if >R* 3n .
The b’s and n’s are parameters to be estimated. 
The ordered probit regression takes the following form:
( / )
.
R SIZE D E RISK
GROWTH CASH
TRUT 0 1 2 3 4
5 6
= + + + +
+ + +
b b b b b
b b h
(5)
Unlike in the former regression (4), DURATION is not included in (5), because it is not a
characteristic of a firm, and rating companies do not take it into consideration. 
The estimates of the coefficients b
2
, b
5
and b
6
are expected to be positive because rating
agencies are likely to assign better ratings to firms of a larger size, who have more free cash
or larger growth options. The estimates of b
3
and b
4
are expected to be negative because rating
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agencies are likely to assign lower ratings to risky firms. If, as Reisz and John (2002) suggest,
TRU is another risk factor, then agencies will rate firms with a more delayed resolution of
uncertainty as lower, and, accordingly, the estimate of the coefficient b
1
is supposed to be neg-
ative when t
year
/t
quarter
is used, and positive when v
long
/v
year
or RMSE
year
/RMSE
quarter
is used.
Reisz and Perlich (2006) conduct the regression analysis of (5) to find that firm size and
leverage are the most significant factors for predicting ratings and that of the three proxies for
TRU, only RMSE
year
/RMSE
quarter
is significant. They believe that since the proxy is highly corre-
lated with D/E and RISK, it should be considered for overall risk rather than TRU, and they
conclude that the pattern of TRU is not allowed for by rating agencies. 
In addition, Reisz and Perlich (2006) conduct two other tests to investigate whether Reisz
and John (2002)’s implications are right. If they are, these investment distortions can be
expected to be larger as the maturity of the debt lengthens. First, they regress the maturity pre-
miums (the yield offered on the long bond minus the yield on the short bond, divided by the
difference in duration) on the same regressors in (5). Second, they regress the duration of the
bonds on the same regressors. Both tests reveal that none of the proxies for TRU is significant.
Along with the evidence that a firm’s rating is not related to TRU, Reisz and Perlich (2006)
conclude that the premiums for corporate bonds are not magnified by any agency-driven risk.
Remembering Miyazaki and Saito (2006)’s discussions, we conclude that this magnification
occurs because of investors’ strong preference for a late resolution of uncertainty. 
3. Empirical results for Japan’s corporate bond markets
In this sub-section we apply Reisz and Perlich (2006)’s methodology to Japan’s corporate
bond markets. Our data period is from January 1, 2002, to December 30, 2004. The number of
newly issued bonds is 932. We only chose 679 plain bonds that satisfied the following three
criteria: 1) the coupon rate is fixed, and paid semi-annually; 2) the principal amount is fully
paid at maturity; and, 3) no options (callable or convertible) are attached. 
Yield data are from the Japan Securities Dealers Association (JSDA). The JSDA calcu-
lates the reference prices (yields) based on the mid-price quotations for buys and sells. We use
the average quotation. The number of bonds thus priced falls to 364. To conduct an ordered
probit analysis, we selected 469 out of the 679 bonds to which R&I, a major Japanese rating
company, assign a BBB- rating or higher. Other financial data, except for TRU, are from the
Nikkei NEEDS-Financial QUEST and the International Brokers Estimate System (IBES). 
As discussed in sub-section 3.1, proxies for TRU are obtained from the IBES. Notice that
the IBES covers far fewer companies in Japan than in the United States. In particular, the
number of long-run profit forecasts is small. In the case of some companies, only one analyst
or team gives an estimation, making it impossible to calculate the standard deviation.
Therefore, in addition to the three proxies Reisz and Perlich (2006) propose, we adopt
v
2year
/v
year
, where v
year
is the standard deviation across analysts’ forecasts of two-year earnings.
That is, when conducting an empirical analysis of Japan’s corporate bond markets, we consid-
er four proxies: v
long
/v
year
, v
2year
/v
year
, RMSE
year
/RMSE
quarter
, and t
year
/t
quarter
. 
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Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics of our bond sample: yield spreads, firm
characteristics, and the proxies for TRU. In particular, we should notice three points. 1) For
each proxy for TRU, some data are below one, implying that long-term forecasts are more pre-
cise than short-term ones. 2) The number of v
long
is small. 3) t
year
/t
quarter
is very volatile. Table 2
presents the correlation between the proxies for TRU. It is worth mentioning that each variable
has a very low correlation with the other variables, ranging from -0.16 to 0.075. While
t
year
/t
quarter
has negative correlations with v
2year
/v
1year
and RMSE
year
/RMSE
quarter
, it has a positive
correlation with v
long
/v
year
. To sum up, we should keep in mind that Japanese proxies for TRU
may not be less reliable than those for the U.S. 
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Table1. Descriptive Statistics
Table 2. Correlation between Proxies for Temporal Resolution of Uncertainty and Firm
Ratings
Table 3 demonstrates the results of regression (4). Four proxies for TRU, except
RMSE
year
/RMSE
quarter
, demonstrate correct signs. Out of them, only v
long
/v
1year
is significant at
the 10% level. With correct signs, DURATION is the most significant factor for predicting
spreads, followed by leverage. RISK is also significant, but it gives a wrong sign for some
specifications. The other factors are almost significant. SIZE gives correct signs, while CASH
gives wrong signs. 
The F-statistic of joint significance for our three proxies (v
2year
/v
1year
, RMSE
year
/RMSE
quarter
,
and t
year
/t
quarter
) is F(3,206). It yields a P-value of over 90%. Unlike Reisz and Perlich (2006),
our results do not necessarily support the hypothesis that firms with a more delayed resolution
of uncertainty will have to offer larger yields, even after we control for firm size, financial
leverage, operational risk, growth options, cash availability, and duration. 
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Table 3.Yield Spreads over Temporal Resolution of Uncertainty
Standard errors are given in parentheses under the coefficients. Individual coefficients are statistically signif-
icant at +10%, *5%, or **1% level.
Although Table 3 does not support the hypothesis, three out of the four proxies give cor-
rect signs. So we conducted a test to see whether Reisz and John (2002)’s implications are
right. Table 4 demonstrates the results of regression (5). Among our four proxies for TRU,
only v
2year
/v
1year
is significant at the 10% level. The others do not show predicted signs. The 2|
-statistic of joint significance for our three proxies (v
2year
/v
1year
, RMSE
year
/RMSE
quarter
, and
t
year
/t
quarter
) is ( ) .3 9 663 =| , yielding a P-value of 2.1%. It should be noted that
RMSE
year
/RMSE
quarter
gives a wrong sign. With respect to firm characteristics, the table shows
that firm size and leverage are the most significant factors with correct signs for producing
ratings for all specifications. Unlike in Table 4, the D/E ratio does not give correct signs.
These results imply that our estimation results may be robust. 
4. Concluding Remarks
This paper gives an overview of studies on the effect of TRU on asset pricing, and it con-
ducts an empirical analysis using recent data on corporate bonds issued in Japan. We present
three theoretical frameworks proposed by Epstein and Turnbull (1980), Reisz and John (2002),
and Miyazaki and Saito (2006). Following Reisz and Perlich (2006)’s methodology, we per-
form an empirical analysis, and find that this analysis does not work well. Our analysis does
Kenji MIYAZAKI
67
Table 4. Temporal Resolution of Uncertainty and Firm Ratings: An Ordered Probit
Model
Standard errors are given in parentheses under the coefficients. Individual coefficients are statistically signif-
icant at +10%, *5%, or **1% level.
not support the hypothesis that firms with a more delayed resolution of uncertainty will have
to offer larger yields. 
The major reason may be data precision. We should notice three points. First, as Table 1
shows, Japanese proxies for TRU may not be less reliable. This might be due to outliers. To
remove them, we should carry out a more extensive consideration of the proxies. Second, the
data on yield spreads may also have some room for improvement. To calculate yield spreads,
Nakashima and Saito (2006) use the swap rate instead of government bonds because yields on
Japanese government bonds earn a sort of convenience and it is difficult to control for the
effects of such convenience. Other yield spreads might have other implications. Finally, our
sample period is not long. So a larger sample size could improve the empirical results. 
Although we fail to present interesting empirical results, we still believe that the resolu-
tion of uncertainty is an important factor in determining asset pricing. In order to test the
implications from Miyazaki and Saito (2006), a natural development might be to conduct an
empirical analysis using stock price data, and such research is ongoing. 
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